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CHAPTER 1: Introduction  
Provincial governors constituted an important part of the decentralization package 
unveiled in Zimbabwe in 1984 and 1985. The President appoints provincial governors 
among other duties, to coordinate development planning and implementation at the 
provincial level. This paper seeks to examine the appointment and role of a provincial 
governor and in that way establish the extent to which such appointment and role hinder 
or enhance representative and participatory democracy, accountability, devolution and 
empowerment, as ideals of decentralization. This contribution examines provincial 
governance in Zimbabwe as part of the local government system. 
1.1. Background to the study 
Central governments around the world are decentralizing fiscal, political, and 
administrative responsibilities to lower-level governments and to the private sector.1 
Since independence, Zimbabwe has embarked on a process of decentralization through 
legislative and institutional initiatives in a bid to strengthen and democratize local 
government,2 as well as to improve service delivery. Among other institutional changes, 
the position and role of a provincial governor (PG) was established by the Prime 
Minister’s Directives on Decentralization and Development of 1984 and 1985 (PMDDs). 
These directives were given legal status in 1985 and became the Provincial Councils 
and Administration Act.3  
PGs are classified as political heads of provincial governments and provide leadership 
to the provinces thereof. Besides the PGs, the PMDDs also created other structures at 
the provincial level and these include; Provincial Councils (PC), Provincial Development 
Committees (PDC) and other sub-committees of the PDC. The provincial administrator 
(PA) also undertakes a very important role in provincial governance. Each province has 
a PA who is responsible for coordinating the activities of central government ministries 
                                                            
1 Litvack et al (1998: v). 
2The meaning attached to local government in this paper encompasses sub‐regional governments and local 
authorities (municipalities). The ten administrative provinces of Zimbabwe are therefore being classified as local 
governments. 
3 Provincial Councils and Administration Act [Chapter 29:11]. Legislation in Zimbabwe is identified and categorized 
by way of chapters. 
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and agencies at the provincial level to ensure coordinated development planning and 
implementation. 
Zimbabwe is experiencing massive service delivery problems and democratization 
challenges.4 Some of the problems and challenges have to do with the nature of 
decentralized provincial governance which was created by PMDDs and related 
decentralization policies. It is against this backdrop, among other reasons, that 
Zimbabwe recently embarked on a process of reviewing the Constitution. Of particular 
relevance to this paper is the proposed constitutionalization of decentralized entities to 
provide local government as a distinct sphere of government; so as to address central-
local functional overlaps, deal away with the subservient nature of local governments 
and to strengthen local democracy.  
In his Speech at a Local government policy workshop in Harare, the Minister of Local 
Government Dr I.M.C Chombo motivated for a local government reform process which 
seeks to create a responsive, robust, democratic, participatory and constitutionalized 
local government system.5 The constitutional-review process currently underway 
provides such a platform to discuss the future of local government. The area of 
provincial governance, particularly the appointment and role of a PG, has received a lot 
of attention in this constitutional-review process which begun in September 2008. At the 
point of writing (October 2010), the constitutional review process is in the consultation 
stage, with public consultation processes currently being conducted in all ten provinces. 
1.2. Statement of the problem 
Decentralization involves the transfer of power and resources from the centre to sub-
national units or local units, which exercise those powers and functions with a significant 
degree of autonomy. Through decentralization communities are empowered to elect 
representatives, influence decision-making and participate in development. The creation 
of provincial governments in Zimbabwe formed part of the decentralization efforts which 
saw the creation of other lower level structures such as village development 
committees. The question is to what extent can provinces act as effective and 
                                                            
4 Chatiza (2010: 8) and RTI and Institute for a Democratic Alternative in Zimbabwe (2010: 46‐53).  
5 De Visser et al (2010: ix‐xii). 
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meaningful decentralized institutions who can respond to the needs of the people at the 
provincial level? Are they mouth pieces of the centre? This requires an anatomy of the 
provincial governance system.  
The appointment process of PGs, as well as the competing position of the PA also 
raises a number of important questions which this study seeks to answer. For example, 
has the position of PG added value to the local government system? What, if at all, are 
the costs related to the overlap of roles between the PG and the PA? What is the state 
of representative democracy considering the sole appointment of PGs by the President? 
Therefore this study seeks to examine the contentious role and position of a PG against 
the decentralization ideals of representative democracy, local accountability and 
empowerment. 
Politics is part of every society which permeates all aspects of human life. Political party 
politics in Zimbabwe since independence has always played a part in policy formulation 
and implementation. The magnitude at which party politics can play a part in the 
appointment of PGs, PAs and in the general supervision of local authorities cannot be 
underestimated easily and undoubtedly impacts on decentralization. The question is, to 
what extend has party politics played a role in determining and influencing 
decentralization processes?  
1.3. Focus and Objective of the Study 
This study while located in the broader decentralization project in Zimbabwe is focused 
on provincial governance within the local government system. Firstly, the study is going 
to focus on how the position and role of a PG in the local government structure impacts 
on the adequate devolution of power to local units. Secondly, it seeks to explore the 
roles of these PGs taking into account their appointment and their accountability to the 
President. Of importance to this study is the need to show how the appointment of these 
PGs might significantly affect the discharge of their duties. The impact on local 
empowerment, bottom-up or grassroots decision-making and local accountability 
caused by the appointment of these PGs by the President will also be explored. An 
evaluation of the extent to which the centre dispersed power, resources and authority to 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
provincial governments deserves equal attention. Lastly the study aims to suggest ways 
in which these tensions can be addressed. 
1.4. Significance of the Study 
The study is aimed at providing insight into the debate on constitutionalizing 
decentralized entities in Zimbabwe, an issue which is central to the current review of the 
Constitution. A strong motivation for this study is also the fact that there is not much 
literature or research dealing with this particular area of governance. This study seeks 
to explore this neglected area which is crucial to decentralization and local governance 
and in so-doing foster debate and reflection during the on-going constitutional-review 
process. Lastly, the study will also engage with emerging issues as the review of the 
Constitution progresses. 
1.5. Literature Review  
Decentralization is a broad concept that often takes a specific form depending with the 
context where it is applied. There are, however certain aspects of decentralization that 
are considered to be standard, irrespective of where they are applied. Rondinelli 
therefore defines it ‘as the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and 
resource raising and allocation from the central government and its agencies to:  
(a) field units of central government ministries or agencies,  
(b) subordinate units or levels of government,  
(c) semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations,  
(d) area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or 
(e) non-governmental private or voluntary organizations’.6  
Litvack et al view decentralization, as the assignment of fiscal, political and 
administrative responsibilities to lower levels of government.7 Zimbabwe after 
independence, like many developing countries, adopted decentralization to promote 
                                                            
6  Rondinelli (1981: a). 
7 Litvack et al (1998: 4). Decentralization is occurring worldwide for different reasons, at different paces, and 
through different means. 
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development and further democracy. Decentralization, according to Mawhood ‘suggests 
the hope of cracking open the blockages of an inert central bureaucracy, curing 
managerial constipation, giving more direct access for the people to the government 
and the government to the people, stimulating the whole nation to participate in national 
development.’8 It is premised on the belief that, people at the grassroots, who 
understand the particularities of their immediate locality, should have real control over 
how state policies affecting them are formulated and implemented.9 
Decentralization, according to the Government of Zimbabwe, is aimed at ‘promoting 
democracy, to increase efficiency and effective service delivery, and to reduce the role 
of central government in local services provision and management’.10 However there 
seems to be a wide gap between the stated aims of decentralization in Zimbabwe and 
the legislative and institutional frameworks. Steytler and De Visser,11 argue that, one of 
the objects of local government is ‘to provide democratic and accountable government 
for local communities’. The provincial governance system does not allow local people to 
elect their own leaders as a way of promoting a democratic and accountable 
government.  
Zimbabwe has always been characterized by the accountability of local governments to 
the central government rather than to the people. For example, Joseph Msika, a former 
Minister of Local Government, argued that ‘…in Zimbabwe, local government entails the 
division of functions and responsibilities between central and local government. He 
added that ‘…the final accountability of local councils remains with the central 
government, which created local government at the first place…local does not mean 
extend the concept of sovereign self-rule for local authorities.’12 Chatiza argues that, 
there is confusion in Zimbabwe around the concepts of ‘local affairs and locally elected 
decision makers, on one hand, and the division of functions between central and local 
government, as well as the transfer of functions inherent in the decentralization debate, 
                                                            
8 Mawhood (1993: 1). 
9 Manor (1999: 54). 
10 Government of Zimbabwe (2002). 
11 Steytler and De Visser (2009: 1‐23). 
12 Msika (1992: 104). 
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on the other.’ He further argues that, the current local government is not only 
unintentional but also undemocratic’.13  
The position and role of a PG have been viewed with suspicion by many because of the 
said alignment of these governors to President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF political 
party.  Makumbe, for example, believes that the introduction of the position of a PG was 
an unnecessary move and a strategy for maximizing political control by ZANU-PF.14 
The Zimbabwe Institute argues that, ‘the introduction of PGs in Harare and Bulawayo is 
a move designed to neutralize the unwanted presence of the opposition MDC political 
party that controls the two cities having overwhelmingly won local councils elections’.15 
While the media has attempted to canvass this issue, there is little academic literature 
on the specific topic. The suspicion about the role and position of a PG therefore 
warrants a critical, academic analysis, which, this study seeks to achieve. 
1.6. Methodology 
This is a desk-based study focusing on reviewing relevant legislation, policy directives, 
and literature on decentralization in Zimbabwe. The current constitutional review papers 
and positions of the on-going Constitution-making process in Zimbabwe are also useful 
for the study. Personal observations are also critical to this contribution. 
1.7. The Structure of the Study 
Chapter one will give a general background and outline of the study. Chapter two 
focuses on the concept of decentralization, defining it and providing the rationale behind 
the concept. The chapter examines the pre and post-colonial local government history 
in a bid to understand the changing policy intent of decentralization in Zimbabwe. Lastly, 
the chapter sums up with an analysis of the current local government structure focusing 
on relevant legislation. 
Chapter three provides the legal and institutional framework of provincial governance in 
Zimbabwe. The ‘mother’ legislation which is going to be analyzed is the Provincial 
                                                            
13 Chatiza (2010: 8). He states that ‘central government vacillates between a devolution thrust (administering local 
affairs by locally elected officials) and a delegation one (performing tasks transferred from, assigned by, the 
centre)’. 
14 Makumbe (1998: 32). 
15 Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 9). 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
Councils and Administration Act16 and also relevant Constitutional provisions. Chapter 
four assesses the legal and institutional framework of provincial governance in 
Zimbabwe. Chapter five provides a conclusion and recommendations towards the 
democratization and constitutionalization of decentralized local government system of 
Zimbabwe.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                            
16 Provincial Council and Administration Act. 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: Decentralization in the Zimbabwean context 
1. Introduction 
Decentralization has widely been accepted as a key feature of public sector reform 
programme and is associated with democratization, development and good 
governance. At the international level this is manifested in the United Nations 
Guidelines on Decentralization and the Strengthening of Local Authorities and the 
requirements of institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.17 
At the regional level, most African countries have adopted some form of decentralized 
government. A properly designed decentralization programme has the potential of 
reaping a number of benefits. In this chapter, the policy intent of decentralization in 
Zimbabwe will be explored against the background of both pre and post-colonial local 
government initiatives. Finally focusing on the current decentralized local government 
structure, attention is going to be given to decentralization at the provincial level which 
has seen the creation of the post of a PG. 
2. Overview of Decentralization 
2.1. Definition of Decentralization 
Decentralization has a number of facets which take different forms in different context 
and as such, it has been described as an ‘ambiguous concept’.18 To this end, a number 
of definitions and meanings have been ascribed to decentralization by academics and 
politicians alike. According to Mawhood, decentralization ‘occurs when national 
government shares some of its power with other groups, particularly those that are 
either geographically dispersed, or are responsible for specific functions, or are given 
jurisdiction over specified physical locations’.19  
                                                            
17 Bosire (2010: 23). 
18 De Visser (2005: 13). The World Bank (2000: 108) defines decentralization as ‘…the transfer of political, fiscal and 
administrative powers to sub national units of government.’ 
19 Mawhood (1993: 4). 
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The key elements to note in decentralization are power, authority and responsibilities 
which are diffused intentionally to peripheral units from the centre to achieve 
predetermined objectives. Decentralization processes in developing countries, 
particularly in Africa, have aimed to promote good governance, improve service 
delivery, to promote peace and as a democratization initiative, among other goals. 
Litvack et al define decentralization as ‘the assignment of fiscal, political, and 
administrative responsibilities to lower levels of government’.20 The shift in responsibility 
between tiers of government is underpinned by several fiscal, political and 
administrative instruments. These instruments give rise to fiscal decentralization, 
political decentralization and administrative decentralization. They define the extent to 
which intergovernmental relations is deconcetrated, delegated or devolved.21 
2.2. Forms of decentralization 
Decentralization can be categorized into four main forms namely deconcentration, 
devolution, delegation and privatization. It is important to note that countries which have 
implemented decentralization have adopted two or more forms of decentralization and 
the result is often a mixture of these forms of decentralization.     
2.2.1. Deconcentration 
Manor views deconcentration as a form of decentralization which ‘disperses agents of 
higher levels of government into lower level arenas. The agents remain accountable 
only to persons higher up in the system. The central government is not giving up any 
authority but simply relocating its officers at different levels or points in the national 
territory.’22 In other words, it is a power relationship within the same organization.23 
Deconcentration is the transfer of power, authority and resources within the organization 
and the recipients of such authority remain largely accountable to the centre, although 
they may have a significant degree of discretion. Manor further states that 
‘deconcentration enables central authority to penetrate more effectively into those 
                                                            
20 Litvack et al (1998: 4). 
21 Litvack et al (1998: 6). 
22 Manor (1999: 5). 
23 Hyden (1983: 85). The World Bank in its 2003 Report regards deconcentration as the weakest form of 
decentralization. It is mostly prevalent in unitary states where central government passes some of the 
responsibilities to the regions, provinces and districts. 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
arenas without increasing the influence of organized interests at those levels’. In 
practice deconcentration ‘tends to constitute centralization, since it enhances the 
leverage of those at the apex of the system’.24 Deconcentration is the most frequently 
used form of decentralization in developing countries as it guarantees central control 
and direct accountability to the centre. 
2.2.2. Devolution 
Devolution, according to Rondinelli et al, ‘is the creation or strengthening-financially or 
legally of sub-national units of government, the activities of which are substantially 
outside the direct control of the central government’. 25 This form of decentralization 
results in the permanent or semi-permanent placement of power to local units usually 
through legislative and constitutional recognition. It is an ‘inter-organizational transfer of 
power from the centre to institutions that are outside the general command structure of 
the centre’.26 The recipients of such powers, usually local governments, exercise these 
powers with a significant degree of autonomy although the centre still maintains 
supervisory powers. The local units are accountable to their constituencies instead of 
the central government as is the case with deconcentration.  
2.2.3. Delegation 
Delegation is the third form of decentralization commonly used in developing countries. 
The World Bank views this form of decentralization as more extensive than the 
concentration of power in central government.27 According to Rondinelli et al, delegation 
‘transfers managerial responsibility for specifically defined functions to organizations 
that are outside the regular bureaucratic structure and that are only indirectly controlled 
by the central government’.28 The recipients of such managerial responsibility include 
public corporations, regional development agencies and parastatals. As is the case with 
devolution, public corporations under delegation exercise their powers and duties with a 
significant degree of autonomy. However the centre remains ultimately responsible for 
the provision of goods and services given to these public bodies. 
                                                            
24 Manor (1999: 5). 
25 Rondinelli et al (1984: 19). 
26 Hyden (1983: 85).  
27 World Bank (2003: 4). 
28 Rondinelli et al (1984: 15). 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.4. Privatization 
Manor views privatization as a form of decentralization that ‘transfers power from one 
bureaucratic machinery to another or one that transfers power between two colossal 
entities’. He further argues that, ‘privatization cannot be regarded as authentic 
decentralization as it does not devolve decision-making powers to the people’.29 Under 
privatization, central government retains indirect control over the activities of such 
bodies which are outside its bureaucracy. Power and authority is transferred to 
professional groups, trade associations, political parties and cooperatives. Goods and 
services which these organizations provide tend to be provided under market 
conditions. 
In this paper emphasis and focus is given to devolution, delegation and deconcentration 
as the main forms of decentralization. Privatization is not given attention because it 
does not disperse real decision-making powers to the people. 
2.3. Why decentralize? 
It is important to note that, decentralization is not a panacea to the problem of poor 
governance or under-development in third world countries. A decentralization 
programmme in country A can not reap the same benefits in country B. Its success 
largely depends on the conditions prevailing in a particular country and the manner in 
which a decentralization programme is designed.   
Decentralization is not an end in itself, the ultimate objective(s) being, efficient service 
delivery, political stability, sustainable development and good governance. If properly 
designed, decentralization through devolution is likely to reap more benefits than other 
forms of decentralization because it has a great potential to promote local 
accountability, participatory development, representative democracy and good 
governance. This section will examine some of the benefits or values of a sound 
decentralization programme. 
                                                            
29 Manor (1999: 4). 
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Lele30 argues that decentralization ‘allows local leaders to locate services and facilities 
more effectively within their communities’. He states that ‘decentralization enables the 
integration of isolated or lagging areas into regional economics, and enables the 
monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of development projects more 
effectively than can be done by central government’. Hence decentralization has a great 
potential to promote national development by creating a conducive environment for 
policy formulation and implementation which is a prerequisite for economic 
development. 
Decentralization processes give decision-making power to the local level and can 
potentially create a responsive administration at that level. The public administration, 
whose programmes and personnel serve the needs and represent the interests of local 
communities, is sensitized to the views and needs of these communities.31 Interaction 
between various stakeholders, and their effective influence on administrative decisions, 
is also a manifestation of a responsive and responsible public service. Thus, 
decentralized administrative systems bring government in close contact with local 
communities, improving stakeholders’ positive perception of government, and 
government’s response to policy problems. 
Riruako argues that decentralization can improve the quality of decision-making in 
central government and enable improved information flows from the field administration 
to the central government. He further states that, decentralization has the potential to 
motivate field personnel by increasing their participation in decision-making through 
delegated authority and responsibility.32 
Decentralization can yield improved democracy at grassroots level or ‘give[s] power to 
the people’ by giving power and opportunities to the local people to elect local leaders.33 
It is expected to further democracy and improve governance by increasing opportunities 
for citizens to participate and hold their leaders accountable for their actions and 
omissions. Smith sums up as follows‘…decentralization is said to strengthen 
                                                            
30 Lele (1975). 
31 De Visser (2005: 24). 
32 Riruako (2007: 31). 
33 For more information on the link between decentralization and democracy see Crook and Manor (1991: 24). 
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accountability, political skills and national integration…it promotes liberty, equality and 
welfare.’34 
Decentralization processes have not always yielded the above discussed benefits 
particularly in Africa. An in-depth discussion on the successes and failures of 
decentralization initiatives in Africa is beyond the scope of this paper, nevertheless. In 
some countries decentralization processes have reaped reasonable benefits, while in 
others, the results have been disastrous. It is argued that decentralization can increase 
social and regional disparities, harbor corruption and cause macro-economic 
destabilization.35 Contrary to such claims, it can be safely argued that, the above 
mentioned disadvantages of decentralization are not permanently attached or 
associated with decentralization, but are a result of improperly or half-baked 
decentralization policies.36 The next section discusses the aim and policy intent of 
decentralization in Zimbabwe. 
3. Policy intent of decentralization in Zimbabwe 
3.1. History of local government in Zimbabwe 
In 1891 the Salisbury Sanitary Board was established as the first local government unit 
under the colonial government of the British South Africa Company.37 This marked the 
emergence of a local government system in Zimbabwe. Government in Zimbabwe was 
primarily based on the principle of ‘separate development’ of races, notably whites and 
blacks, with the former benefiting more than the latter. To serve the purpose of 
‘separate development’, local government was similarly divided on the basis of race. 
Urban Councils, in various forms, were elected by the whites, enjoyed sound autonomy, 
and provided reasonable services to the white community. Rural Councils which were 
formed in the 1960s out of the ‘road committees’ were elected by the whites to 
                                                            
34 Smith (1985: 4‐5). 
35 See Litvack et al (1998: 8‐9). The stringent conditions for successful decentralization have recently been 
emphasized with respect to developing countries (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi 1996). In particular, it has been 
argued that not only can decentralization fail to improve local service delivery, it may risk national destabilization. 
Argentina in the 1980s is a commonly cited example. 
36 De Visser (2004: 33). 
37 Vosloo et al (1974: 184). 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
represent and serve white settler areas and enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy. In 
contrast, Native Councils for black Africans covered the communal African farming 
areas and were subjected to central control.38 Following is a brief discussion of Urban 
Councils, African Advisory Boards, Rural Councils, African Councils and Regional 
Authorities. 
3.1.1. Urban Councils (UCs) and African Advisory Boards (AABs) 
Urban Councils (UCs) were created for white settler areas which were mostly located in 
areas of fertile soils and good climatic conditions, which were conducive to agricultural 
activities.39 A sizeable number of UCs were also established to serve the white 
community which resided in mining regions. Africans were allowed to stay in urban 
areas only if they were employed in industries, factories and commerce or if they were 
domestic workers for the urban white community.  
Decentralization was applied separately, with sound devolution in UCs, which allowed 
such councils to raise revenue, make by-laws, provide infrastructure and amenities, 
among other duties. The relevant legislation which made these councils more 
autonomous was the Urban Councils Act of 1973. The urban local government which 
developed excluded Africans from urban governance, with the first local government 
institutions (African Advisory Boards) for Africans established 39 years after the 1891 
Salisbury Sanitary Board.40African Advisory Boards (AABs) on the other hand, were 
created between 1940 and 1970 by UCs to cater for the needs of African-urban-
dwellers but lacked significant powers as they only served as advisors to the UCs on 
issues relating to Africans in townships.41 Colonial period urban local government 
therefore evolved along the twin-city concept which separated African from European 
                                                            
38 Stewart et al (1994: 4). Native Councils were later changed to African Councils by the Native Councils Act of 
1937. 
39 Makumbe (1998: 19). 
40 Chakaipa (2010: 35). The Salisbury Sanitary Board was the first local government unit in colonial Zimbabwe 
which was established for the white settler community in Salisbury. 
41 See Vosloo et al (1974: 191‐200) for a detailed discussion on colonial urban local government which created 
AABs as mere advisors of UCs. 
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residential areas.42 Service provision was also based on this twin-city concept with 
white areas receiving better and quality services than African areas 
3.1.2. Rural Councils (RCs) 
Road Committees which traditionally existed in most large scale commercial farming 
and mining areas, catered for the interests of white commercial farmers in rural areas. 
They were created in the 1930s and according to Vosloo et al the purpose of these 
elected bodies was to, ‘construct and maintain roads outside UC areas, other than 
gazette main roads, which were the direct responsibility of the Government’.43 The 
Rural Councils Act (1966) transformed the Road Committees into RCs which were 
devolved bodies, with the authority to levy property taxes, rates and services charges 
on their council area members, as well as on residents, and business enterprises 
located at urban centres within their areas. They were democratically elected although 
they lacked representation for the black farm laborers who resided in these areas. In 
terms of autonomy and functions, they performed the same functions as that of UCs 
with an equal degree of autonomy.44 
3.1.3. African councils and Regional Authorities 
Unlike in urban areas and in large scale farming areas, local government in African 
areas evolved rather slowly with the first local government unit, the Native Boards, only 
established in the 1930s. Native Boards were mainly consultative and responsible for 
the management of communal lands which were highly fragmented.45 The Native 
Boards were headed by Native Commissioners (now district) who were appointed by 
the central government, with chiefs and headmen being ex-officio members.  In 1937, 
the Native Boards were transformed into Native Councils which were not given any 
powers to raise local revenues and were subjected to centrally imposed rules. As a 
result they were entirely dependent on central government grants, donations and fees. It 
is submitted that the Native Boards or their successors, Native Councils and African 
(District Councils) be categorized as deconcentrated units of the centre given the fact 
                                                            
42 Makumbe (1998: 19). 
43 Vosloo et al (1974: 187). 
44 See Vosloo et al (1974: 191‐200) for a detailed discussion on Rural Councils. 
45 RTI and Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe (2010: 18).  
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that they were classified only as local or area administration rather than local 
government. This claim is supported by the central appointment and accountability of   
district commissioners who led these councils. 
Soon after the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 by the Rhodesian 
government under the leadership of Ian Smith, a number of pieces of legislation were 
passed to get support from traditional leaders. Under the Tribal Trust Lands act (1967) 
and the African Law and Tribal Courts Act (1967) land allocation powers were restored 
to traditional leaders and the powers to try civil and some criminal cases among 
Africans, was also conferred on traditional leaders. The introduction of these pieces of 
legislation was also meant to counter the emerging black nationalism against the white 
colonial government. By giving powers to the chiefs, the white regime was divested of 
developmental responsibilities in African areas. Makumbe describes how this process of 
withdrawing from involvement in African areas was consolidated by a provincialization 
policy, which resulted in the creation of regional authorities under the Regional 
Authorities Act of 1973.46 
In terms of the Regional Authorities Act, the Regional Authorities were responsible for 
all ‘administrative activities’ such as the collection of taxes and provision of services in 
African areas. However, basic services were not provided comparably with the UCs and 
RCs in white areas because of the lack of meaningful resource raising and allocating 
powers. Local government therefore served no purpose in African areas mainly 
because of the reason that, it failed to provide vital services. As a result of the racist 
character of local government, the colonial local government system was hated by 
many Africans. The colonial regime successfully alienated the majority of Africans, not 
only from their traditional leaders, but also from the institution and practice of local 
government as they were made to understand it. 
UCs and RCs (serving white areas) enjoyed devolved authority ranging from the ability 
to raise revenue, making by-laws and were therefore, soundly autonomous. On the 
                                                            
46 Makumbe (1998: 21).  Traditional leaders as members of the Regional Councils, as well as agents of the centre, 
implemented the most oppressive laws of the centre. The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 took away land from 
the blacks created large numbers of landless people. 
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other hand, African Councils formed largely deconcentrated units of the centre, lacking 
powers to raise revenue. They were furthermore not representative of the communities 
which they served. Traditional leaders as ex officio members of these African Councils 
were used by the white regime as effective mouth pieces of the centre, even arguably, 
as extensions of the centre. Chatiza47 sums up the stark contrast between these 
institutions as,  
‘…local government institutions in African areas were not autonomous, did not pursue local interests, 
lacked local legitimacy and resources compared to those in European areas.’ 
3.2. The emergence of post colonial local government (structural and legislative 
reforms) 
As noted above colonial local government was used as a tool to further the exploitation 
and marginalization of the majority of Africans for the benefit of the white minority. Local 
government was racist, exploitative and subservient in character. It was not only logical 
but also justified for the ZANU PF-led government to immediately after independence 
(1980) introduce reforms to correct the racially based model of governance. The 
government, without wasting much time, in 1980 declared its intention to promote 
decentralization and participation. In practice this has taken three forms48. Firstly, this 
saw the creation of new ministries and the deconcentration of others. Secondly, a series 
of legislative enactments and directives have sought to democratize and strengthen 
local government. Thirdly, a participatory organizational structure was established to 
permit local participation in development. This section is therefore going to focus on the 
second and third forms as these directly connect with decentralization. 
3.2.1. District Councils Act 1980 
The District Councils Act of 1980 (amended in 1981 and 1982) revived local 
government after the period of guerilla insurgency (1970-1979), consolidated the 
previously fragmented authorities from over 220 to 55, and democratized the system of 
local government.49 The Act targeted the communal lands and further required district 
                                                            
47 Chatiza (2010: 2). 
48 Stewart et al (1994: 4). 
49 Stewart et al (1994: 5). 
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councils to be composed predominantly of elected members, with chiefs and headmen 
serving as ex officio members. 
3.2.2. Urban Council Reforms (1980) 
The Urban Councils Act (1973)50 was amended to accommodate the democratization of 
the local government system by removing racial discrimination pertaining to 
representation and tenure in urban areas.51 The twin-city system was abandoned with 
former African Townships incorporated into UCs under a single tax-base.  While 
achieving integration, the 1980 Urban Councils Act Amendments had the negative 
effect of significantly eroding the autonomy of UCs by increasing both administrative 
and political control and oversight by the central government.52 Although the viability of 
UCs was improved, the amendments had a double-edged impact since they tightened 
central government control over UCs, a situation which still currently persists. 
3.2.3. Rural District Councils Act (1988)53 
The colonial government had created two separate local government institutions in rural 
areas, namely RCs (for whites) and African or District Councils (for blacks and formerly 
Native Councils). The 1988 Rural District Councils Act amalgamated the RCs and 
District Councils into 55 Rural District Councils (RDCs).54 The amalgamation was a 
mechanism of doing away with the colonial legacy of separate development based on 
race in Zimbabwe’s rural areas. The deracialization of rural local government also 
meant equitable distribution of public services and resources across the rural 
population. 
3.2.4. Traditional Leadership Act (2002)55 
Traditional leaders have had a role in rural local governance before colonization. 
Successive governments after colonization have aligned rural local government with 
                                                            
50 Urban Councils Act 1973 [Chapter 214]. 
51 Wekwete (1988: 20). 
52 Makumbe (1998: 25). 
53 Rural District Councils Act [Chapter 29:13]. 
54 Stewart et al (1994: 6). 
55 Traditional Leadership Act [Chapter 29:17]. 
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traditional leaders, namely chiefs, headmen and village heads.56 Unlike local 
government, the institution of Traditional Leadership is recognized in the Constitution. 
The 2002 Traditional Leadership Act recognized Traditional leadership as an important 
institution of rural governance by restoring powers to allocate rural land and to try civil 
and criminal cases in rural areas, among other local governance obligations.57 The Act 
further permitted chiefs to be ex-efficio members of councils.  
4. The current local government structure 
4.1. Introduction 
The section above briefly provided the context within which the legislative and 
institutional reforms to deracialize and democratize local government were carried out in 
post-independent Zimbabwe. This section examines the current local government 
structure which is, in many ways, an end-product of the above discussed reforms. The 
main structures which characterize the current structure include the Ministry of Local 
Government, a provincial layer, a district layer and local authorities. 
4.2. Ministry of Local Government (MLRUD) 
The MLRUD is the ‘mother’ Ministry responsible for administering all local government 
legislation. The Ministry is charged with coordinating policy formulation, implementation 
and evaluation in the local government sector. Furthermore, the Ministry is mandated to 
lead the development and management of the sector, representing its interests at 
national and district levels in relation to other government institutions.58 Under local 
government legislation the Minister has various powers and obligations. For instance, 
under the Urban Councils Act,59 the Minister can dissolve an elected council and 
replace it with an Administrator or a Commission. The Minister is empowered to 
                                                            
56 Chakaipa (2010: 48). 
57 S 5 Traditional Leaders Act [Chapter 29:17]. 
58 Chatiza (2010: 14). 
59  S 114 Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15]. The role of the Minister in supervising local government has been 
viewed with suspicion by many. The minister over the past decade has used his supervisory power to dismiss 
elected councils. Some argue that the interventions by the Minister are politically motivated designed to achieve 
political goals. However RTI and Institute for Democratic Alternative in Zimbabwe (2010: 24) highlight that, 
Zimbabwean local government system is based on a delegator‐delegate‐e relationship, with the centre being the 
delegator of powers and functions to UCs and RDCs.  As such, the interventions by the Minister are lawful. The 
local government system gives Minister unfettered powers to intervene.  
26 
 
 
 
 
 
reverse, suspend, and rescind any decision or resolution of councils.60 Chakaipa 
summarizes the roles of the Ministry besides the administration of local government 
legislation and these include, but not limited to, facilitation, advice, monitoring, 
oversight, directing, promoting and capacity building.61  
4.3. The Provincial Level 
Zimbabwe has ten administrative provinces namely, Harare, Bulawayo, Manicaland, 
Mashonaland central, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Masvingo, Matebeleland 
North Matebeleland South and Midlands. Each province is lead by a provincial governor 
(PG). The Constitution does not provide for the names of the provinces and the 
President is empowered to declare, alter, name or rename and abolish a province.62. 
Largely provincial demarcation is based on ethnic lines; with the Shona and associated 
tribes occupying Mashonaland, Manicaland, Masvingo, Harare provinces and some 
parts of Midlands province; while the Ndebele tribe occupies Matebeleland provinces 
and some parts of Midlands province.  
The naming and demarcation of provinces after ethnic groups has its roots in the 
colonial policy of ‘divide and rule’, where African tribal groups where divided on ethnic 
lines to weaken them and to promote the policy of ‘separate development’. Harare and 
Bulawayo provinces are wholly made up of UCs, while Mashonaland Central, East and 
West; Midlands; Matebeleland North and South; Masvingo; and Manicaland are 
comprised of a combination of UCs and RDCs. Harare and Bulawayo Metropolitan 
provinces did not have PGs until 2004. Executive Mayors were considered satisfactory 
to the leadership role of the two cities, due to the fact that, Harare and Bulawayo 
provinces are wholly urban. The reason why PGs were introduced in Harare and 
Bulawayo at a later stage than in other provinces requires further interrogation. The 
Provincial Council and Administration Act is the prime act which governs provincial 
administration. 
                                                            
60 S 314 Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15]. 
61 Chakaipa (2010: 33). To this end, the Ministry has deconcentrated offices at the provincial and district levels to 
provide assistance to low‐level local authorities, especially Rural District Councils. 
62 S 3 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
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4.4. The District Level 
At the district level, the main actor is the District Administrator (DA), who represents the 
central government. Among other duties, the DA is responsible for coordinating the 
activities of government and non-government actors. In addition the DA chairs the 
District Development Committee (DDC), the planning and technical arm of the district, 
which also constitutes the deconcentrated authority of the central government. Its 
membership includes:  
• the DA, 
• central government officials from various ministries and agencies, 
• representatives from the PC, and, 
• representatives from the District Council.63  
The main functions of the District Development Committee are to plan, implement and 
co-ordinate development activities at this level. The DDC also supports the District 
Council. The District Council is made up of representatives (councilors) from various 
wards within the district.64 
4.5. Local authorities 
Local governments in all forms and sizes are referred to as ‘local authorities’, a name 
which covers both UCs and Rural District Councils (RDCs). Currently there are 60 
RDCs and [32] UCs whose combined jurisdiction covers the whole of Zimbabwe, 
excluding wildlife areas and game reserves, national parks, and military and mining 
areas.65 The urban category is compromised of cities, municipalities, towns and local 
boards, which are hierarchically organized, based mainly on size and functions.66  In 
both rural and urban local authorities, councils are divided into wards, which in rural 
local authorities are further divided into village assemblies. Planning and policy 
formulation ideally starts at the village and ward levels. Traditional leaders have the 
power and duty to allocate land and to try civil and criminal cases, among other duties, 
                                                            
63 Makumbe (1998: 31). 
64 Makumbe (1998: 31). 
65 Mashumba (2010: 102). 
66 S 4 Urban Councils Act. 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
in the same jurisdiction with RDCs.67 Chiefs and headmen in Zimbabwe are an 
important component of rural local governance. 
Decentralization in colonial Zimbabwe created racist local government units which 
served and provided basic services to the white minority at the expense of the majority 
black Africans. In an effort to transform local government at independence new 
structures were created, some were reformed and the position of a PG was part of that 
effort. Primary to the duties of a PG is the responsibility to coordinate development 
planning at provincial level. The next chapter focuses on provincial governance focusing 
on the role PGs, PAs, PCs and PDCs. Local authorities are not the central focus in this 
paper although reference is made to them in situations where they interact with the 
provincial government. Provincial governments are discussed as part of the overall local 
government system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
67 S 5 Traditional Leaders Act. 
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CHAPTER 3: Legal and institutional framework of provincial 
governance in Zimbabwe 
1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on provincial governance in Zimbabwe. As described in chapters 1 
and 2, provinces are decentralized entities created by the Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act. The chapter describes the roles of Provincial Governors, Provincial 
Councils, Provincial Development Committees and Provincial Administrators. In 
describing these institutions and individuals, their various powers and composition will 
be provided. The chapter firstly provides a brief discussion on the Prime Minister’s 
Directives on Decentralization and Development of 1984 and 1985 as the foundation of 
decentralization in post independence Zimbabwe. 
2. The Prime Minister’s Directives on Decentralization and 
Development of 1984 and 1985 (PMDDs) 
The PMDDs constituted a central part towards the creation of provincial governments. 
According to Chatiza the directives guided the establishment of grass-roots participation 
structures and provided a framework for coordination of government institutions’ 
participation in rural development.68 These directives provided for the establishment of 
a hierarchy of representative bodies at the village, ward, district and provincial levels. In 
1985 the directives were codified into law and became the Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act. The following coordinative and consultative structures were created 
by the directives: Village Development Committees (VIDCOs), Ward Development 
Committees (WADCOs), District Development Committees (DDCOs), Provincial 
Councils (PCs) and Provincial Development Committees (PDCs) and Provincial 
Governors (PGs).The intergovernmental hierarchy of committees created by the 
                                                            
68 Chatiza (2010: 4). 
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PMDDs was mandated to take charge of local planning and development as a 
mechanism to facilitate popular participation.69 
2.1. Provincial Governors (PG) 
2.1.1. Appointment of PGs 
Local government does not enjoy constitutional recognition unlike PGs, district and 
regional governors, and traditional leaders.70 Section 111A(1) of the Constitution states 
that ‘for the better administration of Zimbabwe, an Act of Parliament may provide for the 
appointment by the President of governors for any areas within Zimbabwe’. The 
relevant Act of Parliament is the Provincial Councils and Administration Act which 
makes the President the sole appointer of the PGs for the ten provinces.71 The office of 
a PG is a public office but does not form part of the public service.72 Anyone who is 
considered a citizen of Zimbabwe may be appointed as a PG provided that he/she is 
qualified for election or appointment as a Member of Parliament.73 The term of office of 
a PG shall be such period, not exceeding two years as the President may determine on 
his/her appointment.74 
2.1.2. Powers of PGs 
PGs are ex efficio members of Parliament by virtue of holding a provincial governor’s 
post. They sit in Parliament to represent their provinces. Section 47(1) of the 
Constitution75 states that  
‘… provincial governors shall have the right to sit and speak in both the Senate and the House of 
Assembly but shall vote in the House of which he is a member.’  
PGs are members of the Senate and their tenure of office as Senator runs concurrently 
with that of the term of governor, terminating when they vacate the governor’s office.  
                                                            
69 Conyers (2003: 116).  
70 S 111 Constitution recognizes the traditional house of chiefs, while 111A recognizes the provincial, district and 
regional governors. 
71 S 4(1) Provincial Council and Administration Act. 
72 S 111A(3) Provincial Council and Administration Act.  
73 S 5 Provincial Council Administration Act. 
74 S 6 Provincial Council Administration Act. 
75 S 47(1) Constitution. 
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A PG is the political head of the province who provides the political leadership to the 
province. The PG represents the province in various national occasions and performs 
various ceremonial functions.76 To add to this role, the PG is the resident minister of the 
province and as such has a cabinet rank. 
2.1.3. Functions of PGs 
Section 10(a) of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act, provides that the PG 
shall chair the PC established for the province. The membership of the PC is largely of 
local government elected representatives. The PG preside all meetings of a PC at which 
he is present and in his absence, the PA of the province presides.77 Although PGs chair 
the PCs, they may not direct them as to what decisions to make apart from those 
relating to the conducting of meetings.78 The PG decides the time and place of the joint 
meetings of the PC and the PDC.79 
The PG must foster and promote the activities of the various ministries and organs of 
central government in implementing development plans prepared by the PC established 
for the province.80 All central government activities at the provincial level are 
coordinated by the PG and PA. The PG facilitates cordial relations between the various 
stakeholders participating in development at the provincial level.  The facilitation of 
cordial relations between stakeholders is enhanced by the PG’s ‘right of access to all 
central government agencies and to all political parties operating at the provincial 
level’.81 The PG also coordinates the activities the private sector and civil society as 
important stakeholders in provincial development planning and implementation.  
The PG is also responsible for advising and supporting development partners in the 
province to ensure coordinated implementation of development programs.82 The PG as 
the provincial head is charged with the general supervision and coordination of local 
                                                            
76 Makumbe (1998: 32). 
77 S 19(1) Provincial  Councils and Administration Act. 
78 Makumbe (1998: 32). 
79 S 30 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
80 S 10(b) Provincial Councils and Administration Act.  
81 Makumbe (1998: 31). The PG is expected to have close working relationships with the PAs and other provincial 
heads of ministries, who however, do not report directly to them, but are expected to inform them of 
developments in the province. 
82 S 10(b) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
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authorities in  his/her provinces in development planning and implementation.83 The PG 
may also perform any other functions within or on behalf of his province that may be 
conferred upon him by any legislation. To sum up, a PG has ‘political, consultative, 
developmental and coordinative’ responsibilities. 84 The primary task85 of PGs is to 
ensure ‘the co-ordinated development of their respective provinces’. 
2.2. Provincial Councils (PCs) 
2.2.1. Composition and status of the PC 
The PC is the main decision-making body at the provincial level. Membership of the 
council is comprised of: 
• the PG of the province,  
• the mayor or chairman together with one other councilor from each municipal 
council in the province,  
• one chief appointed by each provincial assembly of chiefs in the area which lies 
wholly or partly within the province, and; 
• three persons appointed by the President.86  
Practice also reveals that, senior members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, Central 
intelligence Organization and the Zimbabwe National Army attend full meetings of the 
PCs although they are not members of the council. The PC is largely made up of 
councilors who are indirectly elected to represent their constituencies at the provincial 
level. In this paper, these councilors are referred to as provincial councilors in order to 
distinguish between councilors at municipal level and those at provincial level. 
Section 12 of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act states that ‘a PC shall be a 
body corporate with perpetual succession and shall, in its own name, be capable of 
suing and being sued and generally of doing, suffering and performing all such things 
                                                            
83 S 10(c) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
84 Zimbabwe Government (1984: 2). 
85 Zimbabwe Government (1984: 2). 
86 S 14(1) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
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as, it may do, suffer and perform in terms of any relevant legislation’.87 Therefore, a PC 
has a separate form of legal existence. 
2.2.2. Powers of the PC 
The combined leadership of all local authorities in the province, brought together in the 
PC, is expected to steer the development of the province.88 PCs can be said to be the 
political organs at the provincial level, analogous to the Cabinet at the central 
government level.89 The Minister, by notice in the Gazette, may also authorize a PC(s) 
to carry out an act which is incidental or conducive to the exercise of its functions.90 In 
cases of alteration or abolition of a province, the PC(s) concerned must be consulted if 
such action is going to affect its/their province(s).91 
2.2.3. Functions of the PC 
The PC is responsible for formulating short-term and long term policies of the 
province.92 The Council consolidates development plans from all the districts in the 
province into a single provincial plan. The plan ideally is supposed to be aligned with 
central government plans through various ministries and government agencies. In the 
planning process the PC considers various plans from all local authorities in the 
province. As described above, development planning starts at the village and ward 
levels to the district and provincial levels. The PC finalizes the provincial plan before it is 
sent to the National Planning Commission for inclusion in the national plan. 
The PC is tasked with the formulation of annual development plans and other plans for 
the province.93 It is responsible for reviewing and evaluating the implementation of 
development plans and policies within the province.94 Lastly, the PC is charged with the 
                                                            
87 S 12 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
88 S 13(a) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
89 Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 12). 
90 S 35(1) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
91 S 3 Provincial Council and Administration Act. 
92S 13 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
93 S 13(c) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
94 S 13(d) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
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promotion of development in the province95 and it may exercise any other functions that 
may be conferred upon it in terms of any legislation.96 
2.3. Provincial Administrators (PAs) 
During colonial times provincial structures were headed by Provincial Commissioners, 
who were senior civil servants within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.97 In post-
independence times, the equivalent of the Provincial Commissioner is a PA, who is also 
a senior civil servant under the Ministry of Local Government (MLRUD). The PA 
coordinates central government activities at the provincial. The PA chairs the PDC.98 
2.4. Provincial Development Committees (PDCs) 
2.4.1. Composition and status of the PDCs 
As mentioned above, the PC approves development plans formulated by the Provincial 
Development Committee (PDC). The PDC constitutes part of the deconcentrated 
authority of the central government at the provincial level and it is chaired by the PA.99 It 
is the technical arm of the PC composed mainly of civil servants (provincial heads of 
central government agencies) at the provincial level.100 Practice reveals that, members 
of civil society and the private sector also attend the meetings of the PDC. 
2.4.2. Functions of the PDC 
The PDC makes recommendations to the PC as to what matters should be included in 
the annual development plan and other long-term plans of the province.101 It assists the 
PC in preparing the annual development and other long-term plans for the province. 
When instructed by the PC, the PDC investigates the implementation of annual 
development plans and any other provincial plans. The main functions of the PDC are 
                                                            
95 S 13(a) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
96 S 13 (e) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
97 Makumbe (1998: 31). 
98 S 27 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
99 Makumbe (1998: 31). 
100 Chatiza (2010: 15). 
101 S 28 Provincial Councils Administration Act. The main function of the PDC is to consolidate plans from Urban 
Councils and Rural District Councils into a single provincial development plan. Chakaipa (2010: 35) states that, 
‘ideally the provincial development plan informs development progress by sector ministries, local authorities and 
government agencies’. However, Zimbabwe is not operating on the ideal as central government dominates and 
excludes local plans. 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
therefore, to plan, implement and coordinate development activities in the province.102 
Provincial planning between the PC and PDC occurs at a joint meeting of the two 
bodies as provided for by section 30 of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
As seen above, all the structures which were created by the PMDDs and related 
decentralization laws are responsible for development planning and implementation. 
Their functions are mainly coordinative rather than resource allocative in nature. The 
next chapter assesses the extent to which real power, authority and resources were 
dispersed from the centre to provincial governments. Has the position of a PG been 
beneficial? Are the PGs undertaking their mandate in terms of the decentralization 
policy and laws?  What kind of provincial governance structure is likely to reap the most 
benefits for poor Zimbabweans? Chapter 4 focuses on some of these questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
102 Makumbe (1998: 31). 
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CHAPTER 4: An assessment of decentralization at the provincial 
level. 
1. Introduction 
Drawing on best-practice principles and the  ‘international dialogue on decentralization’ 
the United Nations Guidelines on Decentralization outlines the key elements needed to 
promote good governance and democracy at the local level.103 The Guidelines 
emphasize in particular that, representative and participatory democracy, empowerment 
of citizens, local accountability of officials, acknowledgement of decentralized units in 
the Constitution and financial autonomy, are an integral part of any decentralization 
programme.104 This chapter analyses the decentralization project in Zimbabwe focusing 
on the provincial level. The chapter evaluates the decentralized provincial government 
system against international ideals of decentralization namely: accountability, local 
democracy and participatory development, as discussed in chapter 1 and 2. 
2. Problems identified with the provincial government system 
The legislative and institutional reforms implemented after independence to restructure 
local government in Zimbabwe were directed at deracializing local government, 
improving services to communities and deepening democracy. The system of 
decentralized local government has, however, been unable to yield these results. 
Zimbabwe is facing huge basic service backlogs, participation in development by the 
ordinary people remains a dream and, on the whole, the decentralized local government 
system is unresponsive.105  One of the fundamental faults of this system can be linked 
to the current structure of Provincial Government in Zimbabwe. 
2.1. Role confusion 
The PC is the main decision-making body at the provincial level, charged with 
development planning. It is suggested though that, it has been rendered ineffective as a 
                                                            
103 United Nations Guidelines on Decentralization and the strengthening of local authorities (2007: 1).  
104 United Nations Guidelines on Decentralization and the strengthening of local authorities (2007:  2‐10).  
105 Muchada (2010: 1‐2). 
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decentralized units because of the considerable confusion about the role of provincial 
councilors. The interviews conducted by Mellors and Conyers with provincial councilors 
reveal that, provincial councilors are not fully aware of the potential role of the PC. 106 
As a result, councilors simply rubberstamp the recommendations from the PDC. To 
further exacerbate the problem, provincial councilors are not committed to provincial 
matters.107 They devote their time and effort to their UCs and RDCs rather than to the 
province, so as to satisfy the electorate in their respective wards.  
The Zimbabwe Institute states that, the ‘introduction of PGs has complicated the 
running and management of urban local authorities especially Harare and Bulawayo as 
there does not appear to be a legal framework governing their existence and operation 
in an entirely urban context’.108 They are not provided for in the Urban Councils Act 
which regulates urban governance but they are provided for in the Constitution and the 
Provincial Councils and Administration Act. The confusion and complication arises from 
the unclear and unspecified division of labor between the Mayor and the PG, the former 
representing and speaking for his or her electorate, the latter representing the President 
and speaking for him or her.109 Moyo argues that, local authorities are rendered 
‘toothless’ by PGs who are ZANU-PF appointees.110 This point towards unduly 
interference by PGs in the activities of local authorities, which significantly affects their 
ability to provide services. The result has been confusion, hostility, resource wastage 
and poor service delivery which affect the ordinary citizens. 
2.2. Lack of coherent planning 
The PDC must consider development plans from various districts in the province when 
making recommendations to the PC as to what matters should be included in the 
provincial plan.111 The PMDDs created a hierarchy of structures from the village unit to 
the provincial level and as such, requires that, development planning starts at the village 
                                                            
106 Mellors and Conyers (1989) as cited by Stewart et al (1994: 4‐7). 
107 Mellors and Conyers (1989) as cited by Stewart et al (1994: 4‐7). 
108 Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 17). 
109 Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 17). 
110 Moyo (2008: 26). 
111 S 28(9) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
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and ward levels up to the district and provincial levels.112 It is important to note that, at a 
grassroots level, such systematic planning from the village level to the provincial level 
does not happen. Practice reveals that, development plans from the grassroots level are 
usually disregarded by PDCs when consolidating plans from the district.  PDCs give 
priority to development plans of various ministries and agencies of the central 
government over local development plans.  
There is a lack of alignment between the provincial plan(s) and those of local authorities 
especially in respect of the cities and big towns. The formulation of policies in Zimbabwe 
requires that provincial plans should encompass all the relevant plans from all local 
authorities in the province. The PG must facilitate the exchange of ideas between the 
planning arm of the province (PDC) and local authorities to avoid the formulation of 
contradictory plans. This coherent planning hardly ever take place in practice especially 
with the big cities such as Harare and Bulawayo. The leadership of these cities prefers 
to plan and implement programmes without the assistance of the PG’s office. This 
problem is not only a Zimbabwean one as most developing countries face similar 
challenges. For instance Padarath is of the view that provincial governments in South 
Africa are doing little to align their Provincial Growth and Development Strategy with 
Municipal Integrated Development plans.113 This significantly compromise the process 
of intergovernmental planning for effective and efficient service delivery. 
There is considerable disillusionment amongst provincial officials in the development 
planning system, given the evidence that provincial plans are not being used (fully) in 
the annual national budgeting process.114 The Mashonaland East PDC complained in 
its 1991/2 Annual Development Plan about the lack of respect for the provincial plan by 
the respective sector ministries who ‘always seem to have not only their own projects 
but also different priorities’.115 It is suggested that, such scenarios in development 
                                                            
112 For more information on participatory structures from the village level to the provincial level, see the PMDDs 
(1984‐85). 
113 Padarath (2006: 1‐11). The integrated development planning engagement process aims to contribute towards 
the harmonization and alignment of planning, priority setting, resource allocation and implementation across the 
three spheres of government in South Africa. 
114 Government of Zimbabwe (1991).  
115 Stewart et al (1994: 3‐3). 
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planning undermine decentralization. This contribution is of the view that ‘PDC concept’ 
does not work since the national government does not consider provincial plans when 
allocating funds through the planning and budgeting processes. 
2.3. Administrative dominance 
The formulation of the provincial plan is a responsibility of the PDC and PC, with the 
PDC making recommendations to the latter. The exchange of ideas between the PC 
and PDC occurs at a joint meeting provided for by section 30 of the Provincial Councils 
and Administration Act. Practice reveals that, central government officials from the PDC 
tend to dominate these joint meetings because of their technical competence and 
superior resources. The effectiveness of the PDCs as a technical arm of the PC is also 
greatly compromised by the fact that many of the PDCs sub-committees demonstrate 
apathy and a lack of direction or initiative when it comes to provincial planning. Their 
allegiance goes to the central government ministries and agencies rather than to the 
province. 
The rationale behind the PC is to strengthen local democracy. It is suggested that, the 
dominance of appointed officials, have effectively excluded provincial councilors and the 
local communities they represent from influencing decision-making at the provincial 
level. Some justify the dominance of appointed officials by arguing that elected officials 
lack the necessary skills to plan and budget, so it is meaningless to give them 
substantive authority to make decisions and allocate resources.116 However, no effort 
has been made to capacitate elected officials. It is submitted that, the important way in 
which to ‘grow’ capacity, and educate elected officials is to decentralize power and allow 
them to make critical decisions. The necessary skills will emerge over time through a 
process of trial and error. Such a scenario is preferred because provincial councilors are 
indirectly accountable to the local people and they must be the ones making the 
decisions rather than appointed officials who are accountable to the central government.  
The lack of commitment by provincial councilors towards provincial matters, as 
explained above, allows appointed officials (PGs and PAs) to dominate the planning 
                                                            
116 Stewart et al (1994: 3‐3). 
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process and provincial governance. Ideally, the PC as a semi-democratic, locally-
accountable body must have the responsibility to initiate discussion or act to improve 
the planning system at the provincial level.  
2.4. The off-setting of decentralization initiatives by party politics 
Provincial governments and local authorities must work together to ensure coordinated 
service delivery. The relationship between the Minister and PGs on one hand, and local 
authorities, on the other hand, has not been pleasant especially in the context of 
opposition-led councils.117 The Minister and PGs are accused by many of undermining 
the autonomy of opposition led councils and ensuring that these councils do not operate 
efficiently and effectively.118 This is against the background that all PGs which were 
appointed since the position was created were appointed along ZANU-PF party 
structures. As a result of their political party background, it is alleged that, PGs interfere 
with the activities of opposition led councils to settle political goals.119 
To further exacerbate confusion and enermity between urban local authorities and PGs, 
the leadership of the two, especially in urban areas, comes from two antagonistic 
political parties. Most urban local authorities are run by the MDC-led councils while PGs 
are appointed along ZANU-PF political-party structures. These two political parties have 
been fighting for power and dominance since the formation of the MDC and they 
subscribe to different philosophies and approaches towards urban governance. As a 
result of the conflict between the two, sour relations persist between UCs and the 
provincial leadership in most provinces and the battle for political supremacy penetrates 
                                                            
117 The appointment of one or more persons as commissioners by the Minister after the suspension or dismissal of 
elected councils is a cause for concern for many. It is alleged that, the Minister of Local Government and PGs are 
interfering into the activities of local authorities not motivated by the need to ensure effective and efficient service 
delivery, but  rather  by the aim of destabilizing opposition‐run local authorities. For example, a study carried out 
by RTI  International  and  the  Institute  for a Democratic Alternative  for  Zimbabwe  (2010: 24)  revealed  that,  the 
‘MLRUD  is  reluctant  to assist  councils which are dominated by MDC and at worst,  the Ministry co‐opt  them  to 
ensure that they do not succeed’.  
118 Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 9). To support the politically motivated interferences in MDC‐run local authorities, 
the study carried by RTI International and the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe (2010: 24) also 
revealed that, in 2005, councils in Harare and Mutare were dismissed, resulting in MDC losing control of the two 
cities.118 Harare Mayor Engineer Mudzuri was dismissed in 2004 together with his MDC‐dominated council, and 
replaced by the Makwarara Commission. The same can be said for Mayor Kuguradza of Mutare, Mayor Shoko of 
Chutungwiza and in all cases, instances of mismanagement were cited. 
119 See Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 17). 
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every corner of service delivery. To further augment this problem, local authorities in 
Zimbabwe are viewed with suspicion by the central government as evidenced by the 
central government constant and questionable intervention into local government 
affairs.120  The role of the PG in this context has failed to produce benefits because of 
the lack of meaningful engagement and complete lack of trust between the PG’s office 
and local authorities. This status quo requires major reforms to enable local government 
to deliver on its mandate. 
3. Fault lines of the decentralized provincial governance system. 
The provincial governance system seems not to function well to enable coordinated 
service delivery. The question is, are provincial governments necessary in Zimbabwe? 
What are the causes behind the malfunctioning of the provincial governance system? 
Provincial governments lack revenue raising powers, real functional authority and the 
decentralization model follows party structures. This questions the extent to which 
Zimbabwe has meaningfully decentralized. This section discusses the deficiencies of 
the decentralization project in Zimbabwe. 
3.1. Assessment of PCs  
Provincial governments are decentralized bodies that lack the character typical of a 
devolved government. Mawhood identifies attributes of a genuinely devolved 
government. According to him a decentralized local body should have: 
• its own budget i.e. balanced estimates of revenue and expenditure. 
• a separate legal existence, that is corporate status, often with a common seal, 
power to sue and to be sued, 
• the authority to allocate substantial resource, i.e. power to decide over 
expenditure and vary revenues, 
• a range of different functions, and 
                                                            
120 Machingauta (2010: 145‐150). 
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• a system whereby decisions are made by representatives of the local people, 
i.e. the policy-making body must really be representative of the people.121 
Furthermore, Rondinelli et al122 argue that, decentralization requires the allocation of 
sufficient resources to sub-national units and local government to enable these units to 
effectively and efficiently deliver on their mandate.  
The role of the PC is that of a provincial planning body only and not that of an effective 
decentralized unit equipped to take decisions related to implementation. The Council is 
heavily criticized because it lacks resource allocation powers and does not have a 
budget of its own.123 It depends on central government for its functioning. Provincial 
plans have little or arguably no connection with the actual budgeting and 
implementation of government projects and programs. For instance, Stewart observes 
that, planning at the provincial level is done on the basis of the calendar year, whereas 
budgeting at the national level is an entirely separate process which follows the fiscal 
year.124  
As discussed above, the PC which the PG chairs does not have any resource allocation 
powers. It is suggested that, the decentralization efforts directed at the provincial level 
can be classified as deconcentration rather than devolution due to the absence of real 
power to allocate resources and to make decisions. The World Bank regards 
deconcentration as the weaker form of decentralization because accountability remains 
with the centre and the centre determines what sub-national units should do or not 
do.125 
Decentralization laws portray PCs as independent decision-making bodies as they are 
given a separate legal existence.126 However, although PCs are capable of suing or 
being sued, there is no evidence to suggest that PCs have ever sued or have ever been 
sued. This can be explained with reference to the absence of real functional authority at 
                                                            
121 Mawhood (1993: 9). 
122 Rondinelli et al (1984: 5). 
123 Chakaipa (2010: 35). 
124  Stewart et al (1994: 3‐3). 
125 World Bank (2003: 4). 
126 S 12 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
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the provincial level. Giving PCs a separate legal existence but without giving them 
meaningful functions weakens the decentralization project. Therefore, it is submitted 
that, PCs are ineffective decentralized units because they lack real functional authority 
and resource allocative powers. 
3.2. An assessment of PGs 
3.1.1. The role of a PG 
 As explained in chapter 3, PGs are responsible for coordinating central government 
activities at the provincial level. The PG is charged only with coordinated development 
planning and implementation, and does not have executive power. The political role of a 
PG can not be equated to that of a Premier in neighboring South Africa. The Premier in 
South Africa exercises executive powers, which include the power to allocate resources, 
and he or she heads a decentralized provincial government which has its own provincial 
legislature and cabinet.127 PGs in Zimbabwe do not have any executive powers neither 
do they have the power to allocate resources. Their operational budget is wholly 
financed by the national government and they depend on the central government for 
their supporting staff. Some analysts are of the view that Zimbabwe does not need PGs 
because they do not have real functional authority.128 They argue that, ‘PGs earn a 
salary every month and have an office where they spend the whole day twiddling their 
thumbs because they have nothing worthwhile to do’.129 
Because their functions can largely be classified as coordinative and not resource 
allocative, certain scholars argue that PGs need not be elected officials.130 However this 
argument does not hold water because it defeats the purpose of decentralization, which 
                                                            
127 See Chapter 6, of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
128 ‘Who really needs governors’ available at http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/index.php?option=com‐
content&view=article&id=33981:who‐really‐needs‐governors&catid=64&ltemid=33 
 (accessed on the 12th of November 2010). 
129 See ‘Who really needs governors’ available at http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/index.php?option=com‐
content&view=article&id=33981:who‐really‐needs‐governors&catid=64&ltemid=33 
 (accessed on the 12th of November 2010). 
130 Zhangata (2010: 1‐2) is of the view that, making the position of PGs an elected one would mean that Zimbabwe 
more or less is adopting a South African decentralization Model, where Premiers are elected officials. According to 
him Zimbabwe is small in size as compared to South Africa and this defies the whole notion of electing PGs. This 
claim is justifiable to a certain extent given the fact that Zimbabwe can be equated to a Province in South Africa 
due to its comparable size with Provinces such as Eastern and Northern Cape. 
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among other things, is to empower local people to elect their own representatives. 
Furthermore, locally elected representatives are better placed to represent local people 
in governance as opposed to a centrally appointed representative.131  Provinces will 
remain mere apparatus of the centre as long as the central governmental government 
continues to appoint the powerful positions of a PG and PA. 
To further undermine decentralization, the role of the PG is more visible in political party 
(ZANU-PF) activities than in the promotion of meaningful decentralization.132 Makumbe 
notes that ‘the local government structure which resulted from the PMDDs and related 
legislation was deliberately patterned along the ZANU-PF political-party structure of the 
liberation war struggle period’.133 During the war of liberation the provincial leadership 
was   responsible (along ZANU-PF party structures) for mobilizing masses against the 
colonial regime. Although Zimbabwe is in the post-independence era nothing really 
significant has changed as the PGs’ office continues to coordinate ZANU-PF political-
party activities in the province.134 Certain PGs have even been at the forefront of 
castigating opposition political parties at rallies and in the media.135 The introduction of 
PGs in Harare and Bulawayo is viewed by some scholars, as a move designed to 
neutralize the unwanted presence of the opposition MDC political-party which controls 
the two cities.136 As a result of their prominent political-party role, it is suggested that, 
PGs have done little to spearhead local development and empowerment of local 
communities on a non-partisan basis. 
3.1.2. Lines of accountability for PGs and PAs 
As stated in chapter 3, the President appoints PGs to head decentralized provincial 
governments. The sole appointment and determination of the tenure of office of PGs by 
the President means that PGs are accountable to the central government. PGs are 
arguably appointed to promote and protect the interests of the central government at the 
provincial level. Although the budget of provincial governments comes from the Ministry 
                                                            
131 Oluwu (2010: 105). 
132 Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 9). 
133 Makumbe (1998: 40). 
134 Makumbe (1998: 40). 
135 Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 9). 
136 Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 9). 
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of Local Government, PGs do not report to the Minister, instead they report to the 
President. This is despite the fact that the Minister is responsible for administering local 
government legislation and ideally, PGs must report to him or her. However, PGs are 
expected to maintain good relations with the Minister. Instead of representing 
community needs, PGs represent central government at the provincial level by virtue of 
reporting to the centre primarily and not to local communities.  
Provincial Administrators (PAs), just like PGs, are appointed by the central government 
through the Ministry of Local Government to undertake coordinative functions and 
largely to support PGs. There are no public consultation procedures in the appointment 
of these crucial positions. Decisions which PGs and PAs take have a huge impact on 
the lives of ordinary people in the province. 
The lack of public scrutiny in the appointment process of both PGs and PAs is one of 
the major weaknesses in the current local government structure. As a result, the quality 
of local governance is greatly curtailed and the chances to deepen democracy are 
significantly compromised. Makumbe137 argues that 
‘because  they  are  representatives  of  the  [central  government]  and  not  those  of  provincial  citizens, 
[Provincial Governors] do not constitute what may be regarded as democratic leadership at the provincial 
level’. 
The current decentralization model of Zimbabwe does not involve the devolution of 
substantial and meaningful decision-making powers to the PC. Stewart et al state that 
one of the reasons for maintaining central control over provinces is that the provinces 
are, ‘large, powerful and ethnic…’ and a potential threat to the unity of the nation 
state.138 However, such centrifugal and centripetal forces can be balanced by a properly 
designed system of intergovernmental relations. 
The appointment of PGs solely by the President is a burning issue in the current 
constitutional debates feeding into the constitutional-review process. There is no 
consensus among various stakeholders in the constitutional-review process on whether 
                                                            
137 Makumbe (1998: 32). 
138 Stewart et al (1994: 3‐17). 
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PGs should either remain appointed officials or be elected. For example, Muchata 
argues that a ‘PG has a significant influence in provincial governance and the post need 
not be an appointed one’.139 He argues that people should be allowed to elect PGs 
because the post of a governor has a direct impact on issues of development at the 
provincial level. Other commentators, however, are in favor of abolishing the position 
altogether.140  
3.1.3. Political-party based model of decentralization 
In tracing the history of the appointment of PGs since the post was first created in 1985 
it is clear that PGs were and continue to be exclusively appointed along party political 
lines. All PGs have been appointed from ZANU-PF political-party structures. 
Decentralization structures largely reflect the party structures of the ZANU-PF political-
party since independence.141 It is evident that decentralization in Zimbabwe was 
designed to reflect the party organogram from the lowest decentralized unit, the Village 
Assembly. There is no evidence to date indicating membership or even substantive 
participation of members of opposition political parties in decentralized units such as 
Village Development Committees and Ward Development Committees.142  
At the point of writing (November 2010), the appointment of PGs in the Unity 
Government is a point of contention, with the President having solely appointed PGs 
without consulting the other parties that comprise the Unity Government.  The President 
of the Senate was forced to adjourn the Senate on the 10th of November 2010 after 
Senators of the MDC-T political-party protested against the presence of Thokozile 
Mathuthu, David Karimanzira, Jason Machaya and Faber Chidarikire. The four were 
reappointed as PGs and ex efficio members of the Senate by the President.  The MDC-
T Senators argued that the four were illegally and unconstitutionally appointed as PGs 
by President Mugabe after his failure to consult the Prime Minister on the appointment 
                                                            
139 Muchata (2010: 2). 
140 See ‘Who really needs governors’ available at <http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/index.php?option=com‐
content&view=article&id=33981:who‐really‐needs‐governors&catid=64&ltemid=33> 
 [accessed on the 12th of November 2010]. The author of this article highlights that, during the heydays of ZANU‐
PF power, being appointed a governor was seen as a demotion as this post is considered to be politically unsound 
and redundant. 
141 Makumbe (1998:  29‐35). 
142 Makumbe (1998: 29‐35). 
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as stipulated in the Global Political Agreement.143 Some scholars argue that, from 
inception, PGs were appointed to represent ZANU-PF at the provincial level; a claim 
that is supported by the partisan appointment of PGs. Makumbe for example, argues 
that, ‘the creation of PGs was consistent with the creation of a single political-party 
system in Zimbabwe’. 144 He further contends that, ‘apart from facilitating the provision 
of jobs to devout, but largely lackluster, ruling party adherents, the appointment of PGs 
served to increase ZANU-PF’s political influence at the provincial and district levels, 
albeit, in a top-down way’.145  
3.2. Impact of the appointment of PGs by the centre on decentralization. 
Decentralization, as previously mentioned, has the potential to further local 
accountability, empower local people and enhance democracy. This section evaluates 
the impact of the appointment of PGs by the President against decentralization ideals 
such as representative and participatory democracy, local empowerment and local 
accountability. It examines, to what extent the sole appointment by the President 
enhances or endangers decentralization and democratization146processes in 
Zimbabwe. 
3.2.1. Representative democracy  
Decentralization processes are often adopted with the intention that they will facilitate 
decision-making processes that reflect local needs and priorities.147 Representative 
democracy seeks to ensure that local needs and priorities are represented and 
protected by directly elected local representatives. These needs and priorities as 
expressed by elected representatives should be reflected in governance policies and 
programmes. Regular, free and fair elections allow the local people to measure the 
performance of their representatives and ensure that they remain accountable to them. 
                                                            
143 See ‘MDC Protests cause shock Senate Adjournment until February 2011’ available at 
<http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk> 
(accessed on the11th  of November 2010). 
144 Makumbe (1998: 32). 
145 Makumbe (1998: 32). 
146 Democratization substantively refers to the accountability of leaders to the people. For a more detailed analysis 
of democratic decentralization see Ribot (2002). 
147 Devas and Grant (2003: 307). 
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It is through representative democracy in decentralized units that public representatives 
account to local communities and not to the central government.  
As mentioned above, PGs are solely appointed by the President to lead the 
decentralized provincial governments. Local communities in the province therefore, 
have little or no scope to have their needs and priorities considered in policy-making 
because they do not have a platform to elect a provincial head who will promote and 
protect local interests vis a vis the interests of the centre. The appointment of PGs by 
the President means that they more or less serve the needs of the central government. 
The benefits of decentralization such as the provision of services according to local 
preferences, arguably, cannot be realized if decentralized units are created but the 
central government retains the authority to appoint the leadership of such units. For this 
reason academics and ordinary community members alike have called for meaningful 
devolution in the constitutional-review process. It is hoped that such devolution will 
reverse the history of over-centralization which has characterized governance in 
Zimbabwe. 
3.2.2. Participatory democracy 
In addition to electing representatives, local communities must be allowed to participate 
meaningfully in activities which impact on their lives. Participation includes, empowers 
citizens and [must] be an underlying principle in decision-making, implementation and 
follow-up at the local level.148 In this regard, availability and accessibility of information 
supplemented by meaningful consultation is necessary to ensure that the needs of the 
poor are taken into account in designing and implementing development programmes. 
However, if local people are not afforded an opportunity to elect representatives, it is 
unlikely that participatory democracy including direct engagement in processes that 
impact communities will emerge. Representative and participatory democracy are key 
components which are lacking in the current decentralized system. If real change is to 
take place in Zimbabwe, this is a key impediment which the new Constitution must 
address. Any decentralization programme which disperses resources and responsibility 
                                                            
148 United Nations Guidelines on Decentralization (2007: 2). 
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but which runs short of democratization is incomplete and is likely to be of little benefit 
to the local people. 
3.2.3. Local accountability 
A properly designed decentralization programme has the potential to enhance 
accountability. Accountability is defined by De Visser as ‘the ability of citizens to take 
charge of their government by monitoring and reviewing its performance and reacting to 
under-performance’.149 Local accountability therefore means, the ability of the local 
people to monitor, review and to react to the performance of sub-national and local 
governments. Representatives of the local people must account to the people for their 
decisions. It is submitted by Agrawal and Ribot that ‘the effectiveness of 
decentralization hinges on … accountability’.150 They further argue that ‘if powers are 
decentralized to actors who are not accountable to their constituencies, or who are 
accountable only to themselves or superior authorities within the structure of the 
government, then decentralization is not likely to accomplish its stated aims.’ It is only 
when constituencies come to exercise accountability as a countervailing power that 
decentralization is likely to be effective. 
It is naive to assume that PGs are accountable to the local people since they are 
appointed by the President. By virtue of their appointment, PGs are accountable to the 
central government. They report to the President and not to the local people despite 
taking decisions which have a significant impact on people’s lives at the provincial level. 
It can be argued that Zimbabwe has achieved little as far as the promotion of local 
development is concerned because the centre continues to appoint the PGs and PAs, 
thereby weakening local governance. These two positions are undoubtedly crucial when 
it comes to provincial governance. This has resulted in the implementation of pro-central 
government policies which contains little or no reflection on local needs, preferences 
and priorities. 
                                                            
149 De Visser (2005: 25). Accountability is an important principle of good governance which all decentralization 
processes must encompass and promote. 
150 Agrawal and Ribot (1999: 5). Accountability, defined as counter‐power that is any power that balances or puts a 
check on the power of other power holders. Accountability is constituted by set of mechanisms and sanctions that 
can be used to assure policy outcomes are as consistent with local needs, aspirations and best public interest as 
policymakers can make them ( see Ribot). 
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4. Lessons learnt from the current decentralization model 
Local authorities in Zimbabwe should be devolved bodies which must enjoy a significant 
degree of autonomy to enable them to effectively and efficiently deliver services. The 
sour relations which exist between PGs and local authorities151 are a cause for concern 
which must receive adequate attention in the constitutional-review process. There is 
constant interference152 by central government, through the PGs and by the Minister of 
Local government, in the activities of local authorities. It is widely accepted that there is 
a need to supervise and monitor local government, but a balance should be struck 
between the need to monitor local government and the need for meaningful 
autonomy.153 
The central government over the years has viewed local government as a competitor 
and not as a partner in development. The Minister responsible for local government has 
dictated terms on which local authorities should operate.154 Acknowledgement of the 
developmental role of which local government can play must be followed by an 
allocation of powers to raise sufficient revenue, sound autonomy and avoiding the 
conception of viewing local government as a competitor.  
5. Views of major political parties on the decentralization project in 
Zimbabwe 
Major political parties (ZANU-PF, MDC-M, MDC-T, and ZAPU) in Zimbabwe claim to 
support decentralization in the current constitutional-review process. MDC-M and ZAPU 
are advocating for a more extreme type of devolution which will involve the country 
being subdivided into five provinces, each led by a premier.155 Provincial governments 
will have power to raise resources, have their own legislatures and judiciary system. On 
the other hand ZANU-PF and MDC-T want to pursue their own versions of devolution 
                                                            
151 Moyo (2008: 26). 
152 Machingauta (2010: 147). 
153 Machingauta  (2010:142‐149). The current legislation on local government grants unfettered power to the 
Minister of Local government.  Machingauta (2010: 150) is of the view that the Minister’s primary role be limited 
to policy formulation and supervision. 
154 Chakaipa (2010: 40) and Makumbe (1998: 34). See also Machingauta (2010: 145‐149). 
155 See ‘Where does MDC‐T and ZANU PF Diverge.’ Available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201003260698.html> 
(accessed on the 9th of August 2010). 
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and deconcentration.156 It is interesting to see how these different needs and priorities 
will be reconciled in trying to craft a Constitution which guarantees the autonomy of 
local government and democratic local governance at large. Moyo notes, however, that, 
there are clear indications from the on-going debate that some powerful people in the 
Inclusive Government are hostile to the notion of reducing central control and the 
devolution of power and resources to local levels.157  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
156 See ‘Where does MDC‐T and ZANU PF Diverge.’ Available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201003260698.html> 
(accessed on the 9th of August 2010).                                          
157 Moyo (2010: 2), ‘Devolution and its benefits for Zim’ Available at 
<http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/27083‐devolution‐and‐its‐benefits‐for‐zim.html> (accessed on the 1st of 
July 2010). 
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion and recommendations 
1. An assessment  
Zimbabwe was not left out of the wave of decentralization which swept developing 
countries in the 1980s. After attaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe introduced 
various legislative and institutional reforms to correct the racist, biased and 
undemocratic decentralized units which favored whites and disregarded the majority 
black population. The decentralization project was introduced in 1984 by the Prime 
Minister’s Directives on Decentralization and Development (PMDDs), and created 
various hierarchal participatory structures. Among other structures, the position of a 
provincial governor was introduced to coordinate development planning, implementation 
and evaluation, as well as other activities of various central government agencies at the 
provincial level. However, the extent to which power and authority was dispersed to the 
provinces by the PMDDs is questionable given the fact that central government retained 
the power to appoint the influential positions of provincial governors (PGs) and 
provincial administrators (PAs). In addition, the PMDDs did not disperse real functional 
and resource raising powers to provincial governments. 
An evaluation of decentralization at the provincial level showed how the decentralization 
programme in Zimbabwe is running short of important requisites. Such shortfalls in the 
provincial governance system undermine the promise of decentralization expressed in 
1980. To begin with, PGs are appointed by the President to lead provincial 
decentralized governments. The PGs and the PAs, who are accountable to the central 
government, chair the main decision-making bodies of the province, the PC and 
Provincial Development Committee (PDC) respectively. By virtue of their appointment, 
PGs represent, promote and extend central government control in the provinces. The 
appointment of PGs and PAs by the central government is a reflection of centralization 
tendencies which are undermining the decentralization programme. Local people in the 
province do not have the opportunity to elect their own leaders, who can account 
directly to them. This also hinders the emergence of local politics based on localized 
issues that are not dictated by the strong party politics played out at the national level 
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Secondly, decentralization at provincial level has largely been undermined by the 
ineffective role of the PCs. Provincial councilors lack knowledge and commitment to 
effectively represent the local people. From 1985 when PCs where established to the 
present, little has been done to strengthen PCs, as the centre prefers to strengthen 
central government institutions at the expense of local governments. The opportunity of 
the constitutional-review process is a good platform to search for ways to strengthen 
provincial governments.  
Ideally, Provincial councilors must represent and protect the interests of their various 
constituencies at the provincial level. At present, the Zimbabwean system is operating 
very far from the ideal because of the divergent lines of accountability with the PG 
accountable to the President and Provincial councilors to the people. This makes it 
almost impossible for the proper reflection of local views in provincial development 
plans. The situation is made worse by the politicization of government work, where 
every corner of the policy-cycle is a battle ground for political supremacy between the 
dominant ZANU-PF and MDC political-parties. 
Thirdly, the PC, which the PG chairs, does not have resource allocating powers and 
relies on central government for their operating budget and personnel. Assuming that, 
the PC is capable of drafting development plans which cater for the needs and 
preferences of the people in the province, the PC does not have the resources to 
implement such plans. After the consolidation of district plans by the PDC and 
subsequent approval by the PC, the provincial plan is sent to the National Planning 
Commission for inclusion in the national development plan. There is no evidence to 
suggest that provincial development plans are considered by the Commission or by the 
National Treasury when allocating funds.  
The absence of resources to implemented plans formulated by the PC has caused 
provincial plans to gather dust. The situation could have been different if provincial 
governments were allowed to raise revenue so as to enable them to implement their 
plans.158 PGs have been of little or no assistance because they lead a government 
                                                            
158 Meaningful fiscal decentralization largely determines, among other variables, the success of a decentralization 
programme. 
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which does not have resources and real functional authority. As a result provincial 
governments are had been rendered ineffective decentralized units and they merely act 
as agents of the centre. 
Fourthly, PAs are largely responsible for coordinating the activities of central 
government agencies at the provincial level. PGs, on the other hand, are also charged 
with the same coordinative function. The result has been an unnecessary overlap of 
duties and functions which leads to duplication and resource wastage. Hence, 
Makumbe argues that, ‘the creation of the post of PG was superfluous and 
unnecessarily costly to the Zimbabwean taxpayer’.159 Besides performing a few 
ceremonial functions, there is little that a PG does which the PA is not mandated to do. 
This makes the position of PG unnecessary and only there to accommodate political 
party adherence. 
Lastly, PGs play a general role in the supervision of local government, the ‘unfettered’ 
supervisory powers of the Minister of Local Government, notwithstanding. PGs are 
charged with the alignment of plans from Urban Councils (UCs) and Rural District 
Councils (RDCs) and the provincial development plan. As discussed in chapter 3 and 
four, the relationship between PGs and UCs over the past decade has not been fruitful. 
Most UCs are dominated and led by the MDC while PGs are appointed along ZANU-PF 
political-party structures. The result has been mistrust between PGs and UCs which 
disadvantage coordinated planning and service delivery. The Minister on the other 
hand, has used the supervisory powers over UCs and RDCs to dismiss and replace 
elected councils for so-called ‘mismanagement’. At the end of the day ordinary citizens 
in the streets have been hit hard by the mistrust and enermity between the centre and 
local governments because at best service provision meet minimal standards and at 
worse, has been non-existent.160 It is against these structural and legislative 
deficiencies of the Zimbabwean decentralization system that this paper recommends 
legislative and institutional reforms.  
                                                            
159 Makumbe (1998: 32). 
160 RTI and Institute for Democratic Alternative in Zimbabwe (2010: 46‐53). 
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2. Recommendations 
2.1. Constitutionalization of decentralized entities 
Provincial and local governments must receive constitutional recognition. The powers 
and functions of decentralized entities and also of the central government must be 
clearly spelt out in the Constitution for accountability purposes.  The principle of 
subsidiarity can assist in the allocation of powers and functions among the three 
spheres of government. According to that principle, public responsibilities that can be 
exercised best at local level should be exercised by those elected authorities, which are 
closest to the citizens.161 It is crucially important to enshrine decentralization principles 
in the Constitution due to the fact that, ‘the subsequent lack of commitment and major 
weaknesses in the legislative and policy frameworks usually emanate from the lack of 
constitutional commitment’.162  
The constitutionalization of decentralization principles has been adopted in neighboring 
South Africa and Zimbabwe can follow a similar direction. However, this does not mean 
that Zimbabwe must adopt the South African decentralization model in its entirety. 
South Africa is facing enormous challenges in implementing its complex 
decentralization system as witnessed by massive service delivery protests.163 This calls 
for proper analysis of the South African decentralization model so that Zimbabwe can 
learn from the important lessons played out in the South African context. 
2.2. Meaningful resource raising power 
Provincial and local governments must be given adequate resource-raising powers 
clearly stated in the Constitution to enable sustainable service delivery and the 
stimulation of development. Availability of resources at provincial level will enable 
implementation of provincial development plans. It must be noted that, effective 
decentralization and local autonomy require appropriate financial autonomy. The 
following taxing powers can be allocated to provincial governments: liquor licensing, 
                                                            
161 United Nations Guidelines on Decentralization (2007: 4). 
162 Proceedings from the UNCDF Participatory Symposium on Decentralization and Local Governance in Africa held 
at the University of the Western Cape (2001: 14). 
163 For more information on service delivery challenges in South Africa, see the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Coordinated Oversight on Service Delivery (2010). 
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provincial road tax, tourism and animal licensing, among others. However, not all 
provinces have resource raising capacity, a situation which can constrain effective 
governance in poor provinces such as Matebeleland South and Masvingo.  A system of 
intergovernmental transfers of financial resources from central government to provinces, 
depending on need, can address such disparities. 
2.3. Clarification of roles 
It is also recommended that the role of PGs in relation to UCs and RDCs must be 
clarified and legislated. Such a move will go a long way in preventing the unnecessary 
meddling into the affairs of elected councils by PGs. The need to limit the supervisory 
powers of the Minister over UCs and RDCs cannot go without mentioning. The 
supervisory powers, which are prone to political manipulation, allow the Minister to 
dismiss and replace elected councils with administrators or commissions. Elected 
councils are politically legitimate and this requires central government to respect them 
as they represent the wishes and interests of the electorate. This is not to say that, 
mismanagement and corruption must be allowed to flourish in local government. A 
balance must be struck between the need to maintain central, supervisory and 
corrective powers, on one hand, and local autonomy and democracy on the other. 
2.4. Promotion of local accountability 
Accountability concerns which exist at the provincial level have been raised in this 
paper. To solve that problem, it is suggested that PGs must be elected. Provincial 
councilors should elect a leader from amongst themselves to be a PG. This indirect 
election of PGs does not only address accountability concerns, but goes a long way in 
fostering representative democracy. Furthermore, it addresses the current debate and 
the contentious political consultation surrounding the appointment of PGs between the 
President and the Prime Minister in respect of who should appoint PGs.  
On the whole, the constitutional-review process must ultimately come up with a 
decentralization model that promotes local accountability, empowerment and 
representative democracy. The model must be capable of enhancing participatory 
development and able to foster bottom-up decision-making. Such a model must compel 
decision makers to act and respond to the needs and preferences of the people, 
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especially the most vulnerable members of society (the poor, women and children). It is 
only a decentralized system which is democratic, one that promotes good governance 
and sustainable development that is likely to benefit poor Zimbabweans who live in 
areas such as Dotito, Chipinge and Gwanda, corners of Zimbabwe where the gains of 
democracy and decentralization are yet to be seen.164 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                            
164 Some of the remote areas in Zimbabwe where poverty is rife.  
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